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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
prudence it seems doubtful. Nevertheless, the adoption of the
changes would at least prevent the Legislature from amending
city charters (not under special legislative charter) without the
consent of the municipality concerned, and that would be a
definite improvement over the present status of the law.
Huntington Odom
Prejudical Remarks of the Trial Judge as Grounds
for Reversal in Louisiana Criminal Cases
The basic law in Louisiana on the province of judge and jury
in criminal cases is set out in article XIX, section 9, of the Louisi-
ana Constitution, which provides:
"... The jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of
the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence,
having been charged as to the law applicable to the case by
the presiding judge."
The constitutional provision is further amplified by article
384 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, which
states:
"It belongs to the jury alone to determine the weight and
credibility of the evidence, but the judge shall have the right
to instruct the jury on the law but not upon the facts of the
.case. The judge shall not state. or recapitulate the evidence,
repeat ' the testimony of any witness, nor give any opinion as
to what facts have been proved or refuted."
These provisions make clear that, as a rule, issues of fact are
within the exclusive province of the jury, while issues of law are
to be decided by the judge. However, not every issue of fact in a
criminal case is decided by the jury. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has indicated that questions of fact are to be decided by
the jury only when they have a direct bearing upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and that procedural issues of fact are
to be decided by the judge. For example, although the question
of venue is one of fact, it is a procedural matter for the judge to
decide.'
1. State v. Paternostro, 224 La. 87, 68 So.2d 767 (1953).
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The purpose of this Comment is twofold: first, to determine
the instances in which the trial judge's rulings upon evidence or
instructions to the jury in Louisiana criminal cases may so vio-
late the provisions quoted above as to constitute reversible error ;2
and second, to demonstrate that the federal rule pertaining to
prejudicial remarks of the trial judge is superior to the Louisiana
rule.
Rulings During Trial
Questions of admissibility of evidence are properly within
the province of the trial judge.3 While the evidence in question
may be directed toward establishing the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the question of whether or not it is admissible is neither
a matter of fact nor pertinent to the guilt or innocence of the
accused.4 In explaining his rulings, however, the judge is faced
with the problem of phrasing his explanation so that it will con-
vey to counsel an understanding of the ruling, yet not indicate
to the jury how an issue bearing on guilt or innocence should be
decided.
The trial judge may properly make remarks in the presence
of the jury so long as these remarks state only the basis of the
court's ruling on the evidence. 5 Appellate courts are aware that
trial judges have no time.during the trial to consider the exact
language in which these rulings should be phrased. For this rea-
son, the trial judge is allowed more discretion in these instances
than in cases where the language is found in the charge to the
2. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 557 (1928) provides - "No judgment shall be
set aside, or a new trial granted by any appellate court of this state, in any
criminal case, on the grounds of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission
or rejection of evidence, or as to error of any matter of pleading or procedure,
unless in the opinion of the court to which application is made, after an examina-
tion of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory
right."
3. State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937) ; State v. Ashworth,
167 La. 1085, 120 So. 865 (1929); State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85
(1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 641 (1928) ; State v. Golden, 113 La. 791, 37 So.
757 (1905) ; State v. Green, 46 La. Ann. 1522, 16 So. 367 (1894).
4. See note 3 aupra.
5. State v. Walker, 204 La. 523, 15 So.2d 874 (1943); State v. Iles, 201 La.
398, 9 So.2d 601 (1942); State v. Vernon, 197 La. 867, 2 So.2d 629 (1941);
State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640 (1940) ; State v. Weathers, 127 La.
930, 54 So. 290 (1911) ; State v. Hoffman, 120 La. 949, 45 So. 951 (1908) ; State




jury, which should be well-calculated, accurate, and unbiased
statement of the law applicable to the facts of the case.6
The problem concerning comments of the trial judge on the
admissibility of evidence is well illustrated by those cases where
evidence is admissible only after a proper foundation has been
laid. The judge is limited in pointing out the evidence or testi-
mony which he deems to constitute a proper foundation for the
introduction of the evidence. 7 In State v. Logans the judge was
asked to exclude certain testimony involving two persons, one of
whom was the defendant, on the ground that a conspiracy be-
tween the two had not been proved. The trial judge stated that
he "knew the Supreme Court had ruled that statements and dec-
larations made by one accused out of the presence of the others,
without an allegation or proof of conspiracy, were inadmissible,
but, knowing the facts in this case as he did, the said evidence
ought to be admitted; that, if the Supreme Court knew the facts
as he did, it would be admitted." In reversing the conviction, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court had conveyed to the jury
his opinion that under the facts as known to him, there existed
the required conspiracy.
In the case of State v. Nicolos9 the trial judge pointed out the
evidence which he deemed to constitute sufficient foundation,
stating, "[The witness] having testified that the accused was
present at the time the solicitation was made, the objection is
overruled." The court held that the remark was not a comment
on the evidence, but merely a repetition of the testimony and,
though there was error, it was not prejudicial.' 0 Where the lan-
6. State v. Farrier, 114 La. 579, 38 So. 460 (1905) ; State v. Mitchell, 41 La.
Ann. 1073, 6 So. 785 (1889).
7. State v. Hoffman, 120 La. 949, 45 So. 951 (1908).
8. 104 La. 362, 364, 29 So. 110, 111 (1901).
9. 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955).
10. In these cases, the attitude which is reflected on the part of the judge in
his ruling, is often a weighty factor in the appeal court's disposition of the case.
See State v. Hickerson, 157 La. 852, 103 So. 189 (1925), where the court said
that the comment of the trial judge that "until an overt act or hostile demon-
stration on the part of prosecution witness is shown, evidence of threats is not
admissible," was not prejudicial comment. In both the Hickerson case and the
Nicolosi case the trial judge did in fact commit error. In neither case, however,
did the Supreme Court reverse, holding instead that there was not sufficient preju-
dice to merit reversal. See also State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343
(1937), where the court said, "the trial judge [in ruling upon whether or not suf-
ficient foundation has been laid] has the discretion of passing on the credibility
of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence, and his rulings will not be
reversed unless manifestly erroneous." State v. Beck, 46 La. Ann. 1419, 16 So.
368 (1894); State v. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann. 1073, 6 So. 785 (1889) ; State v.
Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443 (1885).
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guage of the ruling indicates only a bona fide attempt by the
trial judge to demonstrate the basis of his ruling, the Supreme
Court is seldom inclined to reverse. However, the language of
the ruling may be such as to indicate the possibility that the trial
judge was biased or unduly partisan against the defendant. If
so, this partisanship can serve to supply the vital element of gen-
uine prejudice to the defendant, required by the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure, before the Supreme Court may reverse because
of procedural error."
There is the further danger that the trial judge, in stating
his reasons for a ruling on admissibility, will make statements
which will indicate his opinion of the credibility of a particular
witness or of testimony. Article 384 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure empowers the jury alone to decide on the credibility
of evidence insofar as it concerns the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In State v. Baflou' 2 the judge, when requested that the
witness be allowed to testify in French since he could not speak
English, said, "if he was at the end of his rope he could speak
English."'13 This was held to be error, as indicating to the jury
that the judge did not believe the witness. It should be noted,
however, that there is reversible error only if the judge com-
ments unfavorably on the credibility of a defense witness. If he
comments favorably on a defense witness, or unfavorably on a
prosecution witness, there is no prejudice to the defendant and
hence no ground for reversal.14
While it is difficult to draw an accurate line between the re-
marks which the trial judge will be permitted to make and those
which he will not, the following generalization is suggested.
There is a strong probability of reversal when, in ruling on the
evidence, the trial judge: (1) influences the jury as to what will
be accomplished in the trial by this evidence; (2) makes known,
directly or indirectly, what weight or credibility he would attach
11. See note 2 supra.
12. 140 La. 1086, 74 So. 562 (1917).
13. See also State v. Sterling, 205 La. 879, 18 So.2d 327 (1944) ; State v.
Richey, 160 La. 667, 107 So. 484 (1926) ; State v. Folden, 135 La. 791, 66 So. 223(1914). It follows logically that if the judge may not comment upon the credi-
bility of evidence or testimony, then he may not express an opinion that any fact
has been proved or refuted. State v. Johnson, 139 La. 829, 72 So. 370 (1916) ;
State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958, 70 So. 925 (1916) ; State v. Johnson, 137 La.
505, 68 So. 843 (1915) ; State v. Smith, 135 La. 437, 65 So. 598 (1914) ; State
v. Varnado, 126 La. 732, 52 So. 1006 (1910).
14. State v. Johns, 135 La. 552, 65 So. 738 (1914) ; State v. Farrier, 114 La.
579, 38 So. 460 (1905).
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to any evidence or testimony; or (3) states that any fact has been
proved or disproved.
Charge to the Jury
The Louisiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure
provide that the judge's charge to the jury is to be limited to the
law of the case. However, as was stated in State v. Nelson,15
"questions of law, as a rule, are so intimately connected with or
blended with questions of fact, that it is almost impossible to
consider the former without dealing with the latter." Yet in his
charge the trial judge is prohibited from indicating to the jury
how they should find on any issue pertaining to the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused. 16 Neither can the charge dwell upon unim-
portant facts,17 or in any other manner influence the verdict of
the jury.
Dwelling on particular facts or evidence. The instructions of
the trial judge must cover every important aspect of the crime
charged and any defenses raised by the defendant.' Neverthe-
less, it has been held that the judge may not single out particular
evidence or testimony and dwell upon it unnecessarily, so as to
make such evidence or testimony stand out in the minds of the
jurors;19 nor should he dwell upon facts on which he need not
instruct.20
In State v. Irvine2' the court stated the rule in these terms:
"[A] s a general proposition, it is not permissible to make special
mention of particular facts, or groups of facts, thereby attract-
ing special attention to them and giving them undue prominence,
but the charge must cover every phase of the case, and if one of
15. 32 La. Ann. 842 (1880).
16. In State v. Burris, 204 La. 608, 615, 16 So.2d 124, 126 (1943), the court
said, "A trial judge is required to limit himself to giving the jurors a knowledge
of the law applicable to the case. He is prohibited from stating or recapitulating
the evidence in a manner which would influence the decision on the facts, dr from
repeating or stating the testimony of any of the witnesses, or from indicating
what facts have been proved or disproved."
17. State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567 (1910).
18. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. arts. 384, 385 (1928) ; State v. Robichaux, 165
La. 497, 115 So. 728 (1928) ; State v. Short, 120 La. 187, 45 So. 98 (1907).
19. State v. Barber, 167 La. 635, 120 So. 33 (1929) ; State v. Rock, 162 La.
299, 110 So. 482 (1926) ; State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567 (1910) ; State
v. Mehojovich, 118 La. 1013, 43 So. 660 (1907).
20. State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923) ; State v. Short, 120 La.
187, 45 So. 98 (1907).
21. 126 La. 434, 442, 52 So. 567, 570 (1910).
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the phases depends upon certain particular facts, or groups of
facts, these may have to be alluded to in order to convey to the
jury a practical idea of the law of the case." The Supreme Court
has held it to be error, however, for the judge to -instruct that a
complaint made by the victim to her mother three months after
the alleged crime was not too late to serve as evidence of the
crime,22 or that "there was one witness who has testified specif-
ically to the commission of the crime," 23 or that certain acts com-
mitted by only one of several defendants could constitute the
crime charged. 24
While it is generally permissible to charge the jury that it
may consider the interest of the witness in the outcome of the
trial in determining that witness's credibility,25 the Supreme
Court has held it to be reversible error to charge the jury that
it could consider the interest of the defendant in the outcome of
the trial in weighing his testimony.2 But, in State v. Rini,27 no
reversible error was found when the judge charged that the jury
could consider the interest of any witness to determine his credi-
bility, and then charged that the testimony of the defendant was
to be weighed in the same manner as that of any other witness.
In State v. Kelly28 the court held that the judge was not guilty
of reversible error when he stated that the defendant must satis-
factorily account for his possession of goods if those goods were
proved to have been stolen. This charge was deemed to be proper
because the judge merely reminded the jury that a legal pre-
sumption arises from the defendant's possession of stolen goods,
which is a charge on the law of the case.
Gratuitous remarks. Gratuitous remarks inserted by the trial
judge into his charge often cannot be fitted into the explicit pro-
hibitions of the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure
quoted above, yet they may be prejudicial to the defendant. These
remarks may take a variety of forms, such as a charge that the
evidence is short, clear and to the point (though not directly
22. State v. Fontenot, 157 La. 556, 102 So. 668 (1925).
23. State v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31 So. 10 (1901).
24. State v. Murphy, 154 La. 190, 97 So. 397 (1923).
25. State v. Elby, 145 La. 1019, 83 So. 227 (1919).
26. State v. Newman, 157 La. 564, 102 So. 671 (1925); State v. Hataway,
144 La. 138, 80 So. 227 (1918) ; State v. Smith, 135 La. 427, 65 So. 598 (1914);
State v. Carroll, 134 La. 965, 64 So. 868 (1914).
27. 151 La. 163, 91 So. 664 (1922).
28. 50 La. Ann. 597, 23 So. 543 (1898).
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saying in whose favor) ;29 that there is little room for doubt ;80
that a life sentence does no good because the prisoner is apt to be
pardoned or paroled ;31 or that if a certain verdict is brought in,
it is without the judge's consent.3 2 It has been held not to be a
ground for reversal, however, when the trial court charges that
if the jurors think they know more law than the judge, they have
the power so to think ;33 or that, although they have the power to
disregard the law, they have neither the moral nor the legal right
to do so.
34
Here again it is impossible to state a rule by which any lan-
guage of the court can be evaluated. It is suggested, however,
that the judge is in danger of reversal whenever he instructs in
an area which is not of sufficient importance to the case to merit
such instructions or otherwise inserts into his charge expres-
sions of opinion or explanation not necessary to a clear exposi-
tion of the law. Moreover, if, in this surplusage, there is an indi-
cation that it was inserted to sway or that it had the effect of
swaying the jury on any important point, then the trial judge
is guilty of prejudicial comment.
Tracing the facts of the case hypothetically. In instructing
the jury as to the elements of a particular crime, the judge may
state a hypothetical fact situation to illustrate the application
of the law. All such charges are regarded as free of reversible
error when the judge charges that particular acts constitute the
crime charged,35 states that such an act is justified if certain
other facts are proved,36 stresses that the jury is the sole trier of
fact and law, or uses some saving language, such as "if it has
been proved. '37
In State v. Williams38 the theory of the state was that the ac-
cused had killed the deceased because the deceased spat tobacco
juice on the window or floor of the accused's poolroom. The trial
judge, tracing these facts, instructed the jury that such provoca-
tion would not justify killing a man. The Supreme Court found
29. State v. Asberry, 37 La. Ann. 124 (1885).
30. State v. Collins, 47 La. Ann. 578, 17 So. 128 (1895).
31. State v. Melvin, 11 La. Ann. 535 (1856).
32. State v. Hicks, 113 La. 779, 37 So. 753 (1905).
33. State v. Horn, 167 La. 190, 118 So. 884 (1928).
34. State v. Newton, 28 La. Ann. 65 (1876).
35. State v. Richey, 198 La. 88, 3 So.2d 285 (1941).
36. State v. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann. 1073, 6 So. 785 (1889).
37. State v. Burris, 204 La. 608, 16 So.2d 124 (1943).
38. 155 La. 9, 98 So. 738 (1924).
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no reversible error in this charge. In this type of case, it seems
to be the feeling of the court that such instructions constitute
charges on the law, not on the facts of the case.3 9 The final de-
cision is still in the hands of the jury, for it may still accept or
reject the evidence offered to prove those facts commented upon
by the judge in his charge. 40
Summary
In light of the cases, the following four questions may serve
as a practical guide in determining whether or not a charge vio-
lates the Constitution or Code of Criminal Procedure: First, did
the facts in question constitute an important enough area in
the case to justify the giving of an instruction? Second, grant-
ing that the law is correctly stated, does the application of the
law to the facts leave the jury complete freedom in its decision
on the guilt or innocence of the accused? Third, does the charge
give the facts only such mention as may be necessary to demon-
strate the law? Fourth, even if the charge be erroneous, is the
error so inconsequential that the defendant would not be seri-
ously prejudiced by the charge? A negative answer to any of
these questions indicates danger of reversal.
The Federal Practice
Limitations upon the trial judge, such as are imposed by
the Louisiana Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure,
are not a part of the common law. Where such limitations are
imposed, it is only by constitutional and statutory regulations.41
39. State v. Dennison, 44 La. Ann. 135, 10 So. 599 (1892), upheld the charge
that persuading the 'wife of the accused to leave the accused was not sufficient
provocation to kill, even upholding the charge that "the extreme legal effect of
such provocation would be to support the charge of malice." State v. Holbrook,
153 La. 1025, 97 So. 27 (1923), upheld the trial judge's charge that the poisoning
of a dog was insufficient provocation to justify killing the poisoner.
40. State v. Irvine, 126 La. 434, 52 So. 567 (1910) ; State v. Kelly, 50 La.
Ann. 597, 23 So. 543 (1898); State v. Lima, 48 La. Ann. 1212, 20 So. 737
(1896) ; State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856). See also State v. Burris, 204
La. 608, 16 So.2d 124 (1943); State v. Broussard, 202 La. 458, 12 So.2d 218
(1942) ; State v. Boone, 194 La. 977, 195 So. 511 (1940) ; State v. Williams, 189
La. 355, 179 So. 452 (1938) ; State v. Alphonse, 34 La. Ann. 9 (1882).
41. 1 BRANSON, THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 101, § 33 (3d ed.
1936); 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 244, § 2233 (rules ed.
1951) ; Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REV.
669, 680 (1918). Provisions like those of Louisiana are found in many other
states. For examples, see GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2301 (Harrison 1935) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, C. 3, § 1530 (1942) ; Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.040 (1949) ; NEv.
COMP. LAWS § 109586 (1929) ; ORE. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 26-903, 26-928 (1940) ;
TEx. CODE CRM. Paoc. arts. 657, 658 (Vernon 1941). For further details as to
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The federal courts, however, have retained the rule of the com-
mon law.42 Under the federal practice, the trial judge may
comment on the evidence or the testimony, or express any opinion
as to how an issue should be decided, so long as he informs the
jury that it is his opinion and is not binding upon them to find
similarly.48
Perhaps the two strongest arguments expressed by opponents
of the federal rule are first, that a partisan judge may de-
feat justice by his ability to sway the jury; and second, that this
system is unconstitutional under article III, section 2, of the
United States Constitution, which establishes the right to a
jury trial in criminal cases.4 4 The answer to the first of these
contentions is that while the judge may comment on the evi-
dence and express his opinion, he is not relieved of the duty of
being fair and impartial, and his being partisan is still a ground
of reversal.45 The second contention is answered by the fact
that the jury trial assured by the Constitution was the jury
trial as it was then known, that is, the jury trial of the common
law. At the time the assurance of a trial by jury was made,
the judge had the same right to comment on evidence and
testimony which he is granted under the federal system today.46
The uncertainty which confronts a Louisiana trial judge who
makes an explanation of his rulings or his charge to the jury
has been shown above. It is submitted that to remedy this un-
the variations in these rules, see A.L.I., CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED
FINAL DRAFT §§ 335, 337, commentaries (1930).
42. Bartlett v. United States, 166 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1948); Frederick v.
United States, 163 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947)
Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1946).
43. Some additional limits on the federal trial judge were stated by Chief
Justice Hughes in Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933): "This
privilege of the judge to comment on the facts has its inherent limitations. His
discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exercised in con-
formity with the standards governing the judicial office. In commenting upon
testimony he may not assume the role of a witness. He may analyze and dissect
the evidence, but he may not either distort it or add to it. His privilege of com-
ment in order to give appropriate assistance to the jury is too important to be
left without safeguards against abuses. . ,. This Court has accordingly emphasized
the duty of the trial judge to use great care that an expression of opinion upon
the evidence 'should be so given as not to mislead, and especially that it should
not be one-sided'; that 'deductions and theories not warranted by the evidence
should be studiously avoided'. . . . He may not charge the jury 'upon a supposed
or conjectural state of facts, of which no evidence has been offered.' " See also
United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1945).
44. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 457 (1947).
45. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933) ; Smith v. United States,
18 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1927).
46. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 457 (1947).
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certainty the Legislature might well consider the adoption of
the federal practice. The probable decrease of reversals on
technical grounds would seem ample justification for such leg-
islative action. But, in addition to this end, the aim of ren-
dering justice to the defendant should be considered. Wigmore
has said that this "unfortunate departure from the orthodox
common law rule . .. has done more than any other one thing
to impair the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument
of justice." 47 Another authority has said that a rule such as
Louisiana's "tends to debase a trial by jury into a contest of
skill between opposing counsel," and that "it deprives the jury
of the opinion of the only impartial expert present." 48 Perhaps
the most appropriate criticism is one made of the former Illinois
practice which, prior to the passage of the Illinois Civil Prac-
tice Act,49 had the same limit on the trial judge that Louisiana
has now: "Under our system, verdicts of juries are, in the main,
the result of chance and compromise. They are influenced by
prejudice and passion. Newspapers have it in their power to
increase or decrease the volume of convictions or acquittals. Not
infrequently they influence the verdict in a specific case ...
Only by placing the responsibility upon the judges to supervise
the trial properly, advise and guide the jury, can the evils of
the present system be minimized." 50
The logic of the attacks on restricting the trial judge seems
sound. The evil of an excessive number of technical reversals is
apparent. Some states, recognizing this evil, have adopted the
federal rule."1 Louisiana would do well to follow suit.
Robert J. Jones
Dedication of Land to Public Use
Three methods by which land may be dedicated to public use
have been recognized by the courts of this state. These are: (a)
statutory dedication, (b) "tacit" dedication, and (c) implied
47. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 557, § 255 (3d ed. 1940).
48. Ibid.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 110, §§ 125-259.72 (Smith-lHurd 1948).
50. Fisher, The Effect of the Civil Practice Act Upon Instructing Juries in
Criminal Cases, 28 ILL. L. REV. 451, 457 (1933).
51. Illinois, Michigan, South Dakota, Colorado, Maine and Massachusetts have
adopted the Federal Rules either by statute or by judicial decision. ORrTLD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 458 (1947).
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